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     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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      IN RE: TERRORIST ATTACKS ON
      SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
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                                               February 8, 2010
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                                               10:30 a.m.
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     Before:
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                              HON. FRANK MAAS
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                                               Magistrate Judge
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be a substitute.

THE COURT: It could be, but I'm not going to require it.

MR. BARENTZEN: One last point I'll make just for the record here, so it's all on the record: Whatever delay may have occurred quite frankly is plaintiffs' own fault.

Had they in the beginning of this come to Dr. Mirza and asked me do you have documents, where are they, I could have told you five years ago we don't have them.

Whatever dispute happened between the plaintiffs and Sanabel, I still can't really wrap my head around it, but we got caught in the crossfire here. I found out about it and jumped into this case and voluntarily said we don't have documents. That somehow Dr. Mirza and I are somehow responsible for the delay the plaintiffs are suffering here is just not the case at all.

THE COURT: OK. Well, I have made my ruling.

Should we move on to Al Haramain?

MR. HAEFELE: I imagine that's me, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. HAEFELE: May it please the court, first of all, thank you for accepting my appearance by telephone. I promise I had multiple flights to come up there to be with you but they were all canceled.

THE COURT: A likely story, but that's fine.

MR. HAEFELE: You are probably better off anyway.

Really, you don't need me coughing in your courtroom.

THE COURT: I can probably hear you better on the phone than if you were in the courtroom. Go on.

MR. HAEFELE: Well, first, I think your Honor noted one of the first things that I did want to call to your attention, that we're in full blown merits discovery with Al Haramain, so any notion that there's any limitation as to any discovery, other than any limits that the federal rules put on us, they don't apply here.

The other point that I wanted to make, your Honor, is the need to avoid discover delay, and I just believe we have emphasized that to your Honor on multiple occasions, the need to avoid delay and obtaining discovery. And in your Honor's most recent decision regarding discovery, your Honor recognizes the need to avoid discovery delay, and those principles apply no less. That rationale your Honor provided there regarding avoiding prejudice to the other side doesn't apply here where we are in merits discovery with Al Haramain.

THE COURT: With respect to Al Haramain U.S.

MR. HAEFELE: Well, yes, your Honor, that's correct.

I will get into the other aspect of that in a moment, but, yes, with regard to how Al Haramain, what I would call the U.S. branch office of Al Haramain.

This court has express policy against allowing

defendants to shield documents from discovery by moving documents abroad, and that same principle applies concerning what I will call shape shifting corporate entities to avoid discovery and accountability.

Borrowing from the language from one of the cases I cited in the brief, your Honor, Cooper Industries, 102 F.R.D.

918, if a defendant could so easily evade discovery, every U.S. company would do the same thing. Here in this case it would be keeping documents out of the U.S. at a headquarters or resisting collecting discovery until after dissolving or making other branch offices disappear.

That principle of treating commonly controlled entities as singular entities for discovery was also supported in the Alcan International case that we cited, which was 176 F.R.D. 75. Like in Alcan, here the Al Haramain entities are unquestionably all members of a unified worldwide business under common control, using the same corporate logo and with regular contact, particularly given the overlap and leadership of the two entities.

As in Alcan, the court -- in Alcan the court said it was inconceivable -- and I would say that's true here -- that the U.S. entity through its actors would not have access to the headquarters' information, particularly through the very same overlapping acts.

Your Honor, in both of our letters we set out a number

of factors to be considered to treat Al Haramain and the Al Haramain headquarters as alter egos of each other. And what I would like to do, your Honor, if you have the letter, the January 5 letter that we sent your Honor, I would refer you to page 2 of that letter. Do you have that?

THE COURT: I'm sure I do. Bear with me a second.
Yes.

MR. HAEFELE: On page 2, I think it's in the second paragraph, we went through and we referenced some case law that sets out a number of factors to be recognized in considering whether to disregard juridical separateness of companies or entities. And going through them, what I would like to do is walk the court through some of the documents that we submitted and show you evidence supporting treating the U.S. office as the alter ego of the Riyad headquarters, if that's ripe, your Honor.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. HAEFELE: Well, if we go one through 15, through the factors, the first factor that's referenced there just doesn't apply here because they're talking about common or overlapping stock ownership, and we are talking about entities that don't have stock ownership here. So, that one wouldn't apply.

The second fact does apply, which is common or overlapping directors or officers. And we have three principal

officers or directors of the U.S. branch office. And for those there, Mr. Al Akil, who is in Saudi Arabia, who is the president of the U.S. branch office; the U.S. branch director, GM of the Riyad headquarters. And those items are identified in Exhibits 14, 15 and 16.

Actually 14, 15 and 16 are important for all three of the directors. Mr. Al Khati, who is also in Saudi Arabia is vice president of the U.S. branch, as shown on Exhibits 15 and 16. He is the U.S. branch director, as shown in Exhibit 14. He is the deputy director of Al Haramain Riyad, as shown in Exhibit 18. Mr. Al Butay is also in Saudi Arabia. He is the treasure of the U.S. branch, as shown in Exhibits 15 and 16. He is the U.S. branch director, as shown in Exhibit 14. He worked from the Riyad office, as shown in Exhibits 19 and 20. He is the lawful representative in the U.S. of Al Haramain headquarters, as shown in Exhibit 10.

If we skip down to the next factor, your Honor, the use of the same corporate offices. And what we see is that in Exhibit 22 we see that the Al Haramain website, which is used jointly by both the Al Haramains, identify the U.S. office as the U.S. branch office of Al Haramain. The website also identified Riyad as the head office and the U.S. branch office as the Al Haramain Educational Center. That's in Exhibit 23.

Both the headquarters and U.S. branch regularly use the same website, the same letterhead and the same logo without

any kind of distinction. And that's in a variety of exhibits from 24 through 35 and then 50 through 58.

I don't actually have the exhibits referenced here, but I think certainly the anticapitalization of the subsidiaries, which is the next factor, there are a variety of documents that show that Al Haramain branch office in the U.S. pretty much lived off of the money, the funding that was coming in from Al Haramain headquarters, and that's through a number of correspondence back and forth between the two where Al Haramain U.S.A. is asking for money to do any kind of repairs to the buildings, and it indicates that the salaries paid to the Al Haramain people in the U.S. came from the funding that came from the headquarters.

The next factor, which is an overlapping factor I think, is the financing of the subsidiary by the parent. Exhibit 10 shows that Al Akil appointed Al Butay the power of attorney on headquarters letterhead to pay any property, equipment, materials, people, for the express purpose of support and maintenance of the goals and objectives of Al Haramain activities in the U.S. Now, that's the way that Al Haramain in the U.S. branch office got open because of the power of attorney given from the general manager in the Riyad headquarters to the U.S. representative -- sorry, the U.S. representative of the headquarters in Riyad.

THE COURT: That was used to acquire the building,

among other things, correct?

MR. HAEFELE: It's basically a general power of attorney so that the Riyad office could act in the U.S. through Mr. Al Khati. So anything that he used to open up and start the U.S. branch office was covered by that power of attorney.

Exhibit 7 also shows it switches the OFAC directory, Newcomb's memo about Al Haramain. He says the Al Haramain Foundation headquarters under Al Akil's leadership provided funding and instructions that governed the activities throughout the world, including U.S. and elsewhere.

If we go to factor number seven, the parent's use of subsidiary's property and assets as its own, just a variety of the documents we submitted, including Exhibits 10, 14, 43 and 44, all go to this factor.

Again, 10 is the power of attorney. And in 14 we see that Al Butay brought money from the Al Haramain headquarters in Riyad to the U.S. to buy the U.S. branch property for the branch office use. And he also brought money apparently from the headquarters in Riyad to the U.S. to buy property in Missouri to build a mosque, and the money went through Al Haramain U.S. bank accounts to buy the property in Missouri.

Those factors also show the informal intercorporate loan transactions that have -- that's factor number eight -- which shows that instead of making formal loan transactions, they were just bringing money into the U.S. from the

headquarters to buy the properties both in Missouri and in Oregon.

THE COURT: One way in which to conclude that documents of a foreign entity must be produced pursuant to a document request or subpoena to a domestic entity is practicability in the ordinary course of business to secure such documents. I guess that would be among others the Cooper Industry case where Judge Edelstein basically ended up saying it's inconceivable that they can't.

When I looked through the exhibits -- and I did -most of them seemed to be the U.S. entity asking for permission
to do things, asking for money and the like. I didn't notice
as I went through it -- and I can't say I studied each
document -- instances in which in effect the U.S. entity was
saying we need particular documents from you and showing a
degree of control, if you will, over the Saudi entity.

So, correct me if I'm wrong, it seems to me your argument is that applying the factors you are going through, they should be treated as alter egos of one another rather than saying, as some of the cases say, the U.S. entity had practicability to control what occurred in Saudi Arabia.

MR. HAEFELE: Well, your Honor, I think the answer is both really. I think there is evidence that shows though certainly the headquarters dominated and controlled the branch office. There is no doubt about that.

THE COURT: No, I am asking whether there is an extent to which and documents to support the conclusion that the U.S. entity had a measure of control, or, forget control, just the practicability to get documents that it wanted from Saudi Arabia.

MR. HAEFELE: I would say the latter, your Honor.

Certainly not the former, I don't think, because of the control of the headquarters over the branch. I think the practicability is present as well because there are instances where they asked for information and they got it.

In the normal course of business if the branch office asked for information -- I think there is one instance where they asked for Albanian literature to give out to the Albanian refugees, and they wanted to be able to provide Islamic literature for the Albanians. They asked for it and got it. And I think just the fact that they asked -- when they asked for money for various things, they were able to get it. So if they asked for it, they were certainly able to get these things.

THE COURT: OK. I interrupted you as you with going through the list of factors.

MR. HAEFELE: OK. But to finish up your thought, your Honor, yes, the other aspect is what I was working on, which is that the evidence shows more than just that there is an ability to get documents; it's that they are the alter ego of each

other. Ands that's the factors I was working on, so your Honor is right on that.

THE COURT: I have had the issue, quite frankly, arise with worldwide accounting firms, where typically there is the U.S. entity, there is entities in a host of countries, and frequently there is a logo but not a worldwide overseer in any particular locality. And I have had that issue arise at least twice with arguably inconsistent results but based on the way in which particular accounting firms operated and held themselves out. So, it seems to me that it's a very fact bound inquiry.

MR. HAEFELE: I agree, your Honor, and I think that's what the case law said, which is why I thought it helpful if I went through and walked you through each of the factors, to show you that there was some evidence indicating that at least by my count nine or ten of the factors, if not more, weigh in favor of alter ego relationship.

THE COURT: And I take it you don't dispute that as to this issue the plaintiffs have the burden.

MR. HAEFELE: As to the issue of showing that there is some evidence of this? Yeah. Which I think that we have.

THE COURT: Well, what I was referring to is that you have the burden of establishing that there is a basis for saying that the two should be treated as fungible in terms of documents.

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MR. HAEFELE: Yes, I agree.

THE COURT: OK. Go on. I'm sorry.

MR. HAEFELE: I think we have indicated factor eight, informal intercorporate loan transactions. We have Exhibits 10 and 14.

Then we move to incorporation of the subsidiary by the parent. And the fact of the matter is that the Akil power of attorney to Al Butay indicates that Mr. Al Butay was sent to the U.S. for the purpose of setting up the entity that's the U.S. branch. And when it was eventually set up the directors became directors that I referenced earlier, which is three of them are headquarters people, and the fourth is Mr. Sayer or Mr. Seragati, who is the local person in Oregon that they used to be the person on the ground.

You also have Exhibit 44 which is a visit from a headquarters person reporting on the U.S. office, saying that Al Haramain took on a great responsibility when deciding to open the office in the U.S.

Moving to factor eleven, decision making for the subsidiary by the parent and the principals. And the documents we submitted are just rife with examples of that, including Exhibit 7, 8 and 9. Exhibit 7 is Director Newcomb's memo regarding the degree of interaction among Al Haramain branches and the headquarters in Riyad, noting that Al Akil had treated the entirety of Al Haramain's one entity absolutely centralized

and that Al Haramain's director Al Khati characterized out

Akil's governance of Al Haramain as autocratic and centralist,

including all of the branch offices.

Al Akil was the quote only individual with the full decision making on spending and the one with the authority to hire employees, even if it was just a janitor. And then if we look at Exhibits 26, 27, 28, 29, 34, 36, 37 and 38, they all show various examples of the U.S. office asking the Al Haramain Riyad headquarters for funding for various things, from electrical repairs, to building repairs, to property repairs, to literature for the Albanians, the funds to shelter a camel they had in the Oregon office.

And then one Exhibit, 29, the U.S. office is asking
Riyad for approval, advice and immediate support on these goals
and ambitions, and to give them future backing.

All of these documents show that the decision making for the subsidiary came from the parent.

Factor Twelve is the subsidiary's directors do not act independently in the interest of the subsidiary but in the interest of the parent. And this is important because I think part of the evidence for this is that three of the four individuals that run Al Haramain in the U.S. are Saudi individuals that work with the headquarters. Exhibits 7, 8 and 9 support the factors, especially because Al Akil was the director of both the U.S. branch and the Riyad headquarters.

And Exhibit 43, which is the letter from an attorney at Bernabei to OFAC recognizes that \$150,000 in donations to the U.S. office were sent to the Riyad office.

Fact Fourteen is the nonobservance of formal legal requirements. And two instances of that that are evidenced are in Exhibit 14 which indicated in two instances Mr. Al Butay bringing substantial sums of money into the U.S. to buy property for the branch office, the property in Oregon and property again in Missouri.

And just some other factors that aren't in the 1 through 15 but I think that are important are the overlapping identification of the two offices. Exhibit 5 shows alphabetical listing of SBNs and block persons, and it lists the alternate name of Al Haramain Islamic Foundation as Al Haramain United States Branch.

THE COURT: I understand that aspect of it. I'm not sure how somebody from the Saudi entity bringing money to the U.S. falls under the category of nonobservance of formal legal requirements.

MR. HAEFELE: Well, instead of doing the formal loan transactions that ought to have been performed if they were considered to be separate entities, instead of making a loan or instead of putting on paper formal transactions, what they did is they just slipped money into the U.S. and put it into bank accounts for the U.S. entity and ran with it.

If they were separate entities, your Honor, then there should have been loan documents that indicated that there were separate entities that were involved, and I don't see any indication of that.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. HAEFELE: So, running through the documents that we submitted, your Honor, by my count there is one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten of them, plus another one of the overlapping identifications, 11 of 16. And, you know, I'm not going to say we need to weigh and if I get over half of them we're good. But, as a whole, if you look at it not only do 11 of the 16 match, but out of the ones that are left they just don't apply under the circumstances because they can't apply. For example, there is no stock here. The parent exists solely as a holding company of the subsidiary, that sort of applies. It's really just a holding entity for all the others, but it's that plus more.

The parent and subsidiary file consolidated income tax returns is another factor but that doesn't apply here because they don't file income tax in this country.

So, I think if you weigh all of the factors, your Honor, what we get is a very strong indication that Al Haramain U.S.A. is the alter ego of the headquarters. And that seems to be exactly what the U.S. government has indicated when it has identified the headquarters as being the branch office of the

headquarters.

THE COURT: Go on.

MR. HAEFELE: There are just some other problems that we would ask the court to take into account as well, and some of these I think were highlighted earlier in the argument that we heard a few moments ago regarding Sana Bell, and it has also been the subject of other discussion before your Honor, and that's what I would call -- well, I think Mr. Kriendler earlier referred to it as a shell game, but I would call it the problems with the mystery of the disappearing corporations and the mystery of corporate assets.

The one problem is the shell game with the corporate entities being either dissolved or mysteriously disappearing, and it's become a theme in the litigation. And that's one of the problems that I think Mr. Kabat has indicated in his response and said, well, the headquarters doesn't exist anymore, so what are we to do? Well, the answer is that we are to try and get -- first of all, they were supposed to get all of the documents responsive to discovery from the get-go, and if they didn't do that then that's a problem we need to face as well.

The other problem is the problem of ignoring -- what I will call the mystery of the corporate actions. And the defendants seem to keep pointing to these corporate entities as though they act mysteriously on their own. They don't. They

act through the individuals that are the corporations. And so if there are individuals that are involved here, those individuals are the individuals that we need to look to to get the documents from. Al Haramain acts through the individuals, and yet they ask the court to ignore that fact.

Some of the people -- in this instance represented by the very same counsel -- have filed what clearly contain Al Haramain documents. One of the affidavits that came back to us in the reply indicates that Mr. Al Butay has a file that has at least some Al Haramain documents in it. We didn't get those. They came to us. We didn't get them from Al Haramain directly as a result of the various requests; they came because they happened to be in an OFAC file. They were provided by Al Haramain to OFAC when they wanted to make their own arguments.

THE COURT: Mr. Al Butay submitted an affidavit though, as did Mr. Nelson, both of which you say are insufficiently specific, at least one of which seemed fairly specific. So, I'm not sure what your gripe was there.

MR. HAEFELE: Well, I would have to look back, your Honor, but there is a curious problem with the affidavits. The affidavits that were submitted with the motion or the opposition regarding the efforts employed to get responsive documents came from someone who at the time that's pertinent here had little to do with Al Haramain until fairly recently. He was not a director at the time. He is not listed in the

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document as being a director until fairly recently.

THE COURT: That's Mr. Nelson.

That's Mr. Nelson, yes, your Honor. MR. HAEFELE: we get nothing about those efforts on the three or four primary actors for Al Haramain at the time, at least two who are also represented by the same counsel. And those people, I think Mr. Seda and Mr. Al Butay, are both I believe represented by the same counsel as Al Haramain U.S.A. branch. And I don't recall as to Mr. Al Akil. But it raises the issue of Al Haramain's efforts to actively collect responsive documents in a timely and complete manner, when none of the documents that were submitted back to us -- including the one that came from Mr. Al Butay himself -- indicates what efforts were actually done to try and collect documents in a timely manner and in a complete manner. We don't know. We know very little, if anything, on the efforts that have been made by Al Haramain to get documents from Mr. Al Akil, from Mr. Seragati or from Mr. Al Butay. You know, he could have said something in his declaration, but he didn't.

And none of these players at Al Haramain ever say anything about any efforts to obtain documents, despite the fact that they have been in Saudi Arabia for years following 9/11. And instead we get a single affidavit from a relative outsider to Al Haramain, saying very little about any of the efforts made to get the information.

And on that issue, your Honor, that is pretty much what I had to say. I think there is several other issues that were raised, including the counting interrogatories or whether we should use interrogatories more or less. And in that instance I think your Honor I would rely on what we wrote in our letters.

And the other issue, your Honor, the problem is the definition of material support for requests 15 and 16, and we just have a problem where we were specific in terms of what we were requesting, and they come back and they try to define it as saying, well, because the word "material support" showed up in the request we take the liberty of saying unilaterally our stuff wasn't material support. That not what the request was, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, at so that one it seemed to me the problem may be where the comma is or isn't placed. But we will get to that as we go forward.

Mr. Kabat? Is that the way you pronounce it?

MR. KABAT: Yes.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. KABAT: Good morning, your Honor. Let me just say we're here more than five years after producing more than 50,000 pages of documents and publications and the CD-ROMs with all the financial records from the Oregon group. Now, we exchanged a lot correspondence with plaintiffs counsel way back

in '03, '04 and '05. Plaintiffs did not then respond to most of the issues we raised in our correspondence, and plaintiff waited over five years to really raise the discovery issue with the court.

Now, the fundamental problem that I have with their motion to compel, is it's not a motion to compel about the activities and operations of the Oregon Group. Instead, plaintiff, they are trying to use the Oregon Group as a method for obtaining information about the activities and operations of the Saudi Group, which is another defendant.

And I submit that you should deny the Burnett plaintiff's motion to compel because essentially the plaintiffs are seeking discovery from the Oregon defendant of documents and information that's in the possession, custody and control of other defendants, principally the Saudi defendants, Saudi Al Haramain Group.

THE COURT: I thought your position is -- maybe I misunderstood it -- that the Saudi Foundation at least couldn't produce documents because the Saudi government shut it down.

Are you talking about documents in the possession of the individuals who were the officers, or in the possession of the Saudi Foundation, or both?

MR. KABAT: Well, plaintiff is trying to seek both through --

THE COURT: No, I understand plaintiffs want

everything. But what you were saying was, well, don't give them the documents held by the -- I think you used the phrase Saudi defendants, one of whom is the Foundation itself, and in your papers there were representations that the Saudi Foundation was shut down by the Saudi government, which sounded like, you know, put a padlock on the front door.

Is that what you're saying? Or does the Saudi Foundation in fact have access to documents?

MR. KABAT: It is my understanding they do not. Since the government closed it down both Mr. Albans and Mr. Nelson have made repeated attempts while in Saudi Arabia to obtain any documents, because, after all, they could be exculpatory documents for us as well. We would like to get that information too, but we can't.

THE COURT: Well, one of the things -- and I understand the points you have made about delay, and certainly I don't disagree with you there were long gaps between when you write back to the plaintiffs and when they respond at times -- but one thing they want to focus on, which the affidavits that you submitted don't seem to address, is what happened in the period after either it was apparent that litigation was imminent or certainly when the earliest of these lawsuits was filed between then and when the Saudi government shut down the Saudi Foundation, in terms of preserving documents? I mean that, it seems to me, is one of the issues that Mr. Haefele and

others are trying to focus on undoubtedly as the precursor to an exfoliation motion.

MR. KABAT: Well, your Honor, I can't speak to what the Saudi defendants have done with respect to its documents, but I can only say for ourselves, our positions. The case originated with Judge Robertson. In fact one of the very first motions involved that we are independent, a separate corporate entity from the Saudi defendant, and our position in fact during the initial discovery conference we had back in August of '03, almost seven years ago, was we only have possession, custody and control of the Oregon Group documents. We produced those documents in '04. So, our position has always been it's a separate corporate defendant, we don't have custody and control of the Saudi defendant documents.

I don't see where that puts an obligation on us to tell another defendant, represented by another counsel, oh, by the way, you need to preserve your documents just in case the plaintiffs come after us in order to get your documents.

I mean there are numerous defendants in this case. It's not my responsibility to issue document preservation letters to codefendants.

THE COURT: Well, but that really is the issue.

Mr. Haefele says going through these 15 factors that 11 weigh in his favor and most of the others are simply inapplicable.

If you use those factors or some other factors and he's right

that I guess both as a matter of law and fact the Saudi and U.S. entities should be viewed as a single organization, then what you just said in terms of it not being your obligation may be wrong. Right?

MR. KABAT: Well, that sort of begs the question of why the plaintiff named the Oregon Group as a separate defendant. We were served separately with a subpoena out in Ashland. Plaintiff from the outset recognized that the Oregon defendant was a separate one. They did not try to name it as one defendant. They had a different subpoena. We were served out in Oregon. They were served -- Saudi Group I believe was served by publication -- I'm not sure now -- but the plaintiff recognized at the outset these were different defendants, they had to be sued and served separately.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. KABAT: I'd like to add to some of the other points that Mr. Haefele mentioned.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. KABAT: First of all, Mr. Haefele made reference to the fact that the Oregon Group requested publication from the Saudi Group. We point out, first of all, those were primarily various Islamic type publications which we have produced in discovery, but Islamic publications, religious publications, are not the same as corporate operational documents. As your Honor recognized, we did not see anything

in the document where the Oregon Group was requesting these sort of corporate operational documents from the Saudi Group. I would just like to mention two cases that I think are dispositive of the plaintiff's discovery request. The first case is the Securities and Exchange Commission --

THE COURT: Which one?

MR. KABAT: Securities and Exchange Commission v.

Credit Bancorp, a case from 2000, Judge Sweet of this court.

Judge Sweet said that the burden is on the party seeking

discovery to make a showing that the other party "has control over the materials sought".

We simply do not have control over the Saudi Group documents.

The other case I want to emphasize is the Second Circuit's opinion, and it's a hard name to spell, the Shcherbakovskiy case, Second Circuit 2007. It held that it was reversible error to impose sanctions on the party for failing to produce documents from a related overseas corporate entity, since, as the Second Circuit said, a party is not obligated to produce documents that it does not possess or cannot obtain. The Shcherbakovskiy holding I submit applies with equal force here.

And there is a third decision by Judge Chin of this court called M'Baye v. New Jersey Sports. And Judge Chin found that if the party made an effort to get documents from an

overseas agent but was unsuccessful in getting those documents, that showed that the party lacked the requisite control over the documents.

THE COURT: Well, that's why I was asking Mr. Haefele those questions. He being a good lawyer wouldn't concede that that was not a theory that the plaintiffs could prevail on, and he pointed, when I asked about the U.S. entity's ability to compel the Saudi entity to do something, he pointed to requesting literature and getting it, which frankly it seems to me isn't the most persuasive evidence that the U.S. entity might have practical control such that it could in effect at the stage when both of these foundations were going concerns so that it could say we don't care what you think, Saudi Arabia, send us money or send us literature, I suppose.

And I think that the evidence that the U.S. entity could compel anything from the other entity is slim at best and perhaps nonexistent. I haven't studied, as I think I said before, all of the exhibits, although I have looked at them all. But as I read the case law, they don't have to make that showing if they can show that as a matter of law and fact the two entities should be treated as one entity. And certainly they were separately sued, but I'm not sure that's dispositive.

If the interrelationship between the two is so great that they should be viewed as one, then it seems to me it's appropriate to say that discovery addressed to the U.S. entity

calls for documents in the possession, custody or control of the Saudi entity as well. And I think the operative time period, I think we're dealing with a window period here which is: What was the case that the date that the suit was filed or reasonably anticipated, up until the point that the discovery requests first were served?

So, you know, if I had to take a snapshot, I guess it would be that I need to focus on that period of I guess two years or so.

MR. HAEFELE: Your Honor, can I make two additional points?

THE COURT: Well, why don't you let Mr. Kabat finish.

MR. HAEFELE: Absolutely. I thought he was done. My
apologies.

THE COURT: You couldn't see he was working down at his papers for his next point.

MR. KABAT: Yeah. During that brief time period in which the lawsuit was filed, which I believe was in August 2002 roughly, when the discovery requests were served, which I believe was in October or November of '03, during that time period in fact when the two groups were moving apart, the Oregon Group got the resignation of two of the directors. Two of the three Saudi directors resigned from the board of the Oregon Group. What was also happening during that time period is back in February of '04, while we were still discussing the

discovery issues, the Department of Treasury initiated an investigation of the Oregon Group, which consequently limited the ability of the Oregon Group to do anything other than retain counsel and litigate. So, we were not then in a position to escalate our -- the Oregon Group was not in a position to escalate its involvement with the Saudi Group because the director of the Saudi Group was himself also under investigation by Treasury at that same time period. So, during that period that your Honor identified, the two groups were moving apart partly because of the ongoing Treasury investigation.

So, as a practical matter, thinking back to that time period I don't see how we could have easily gotten the Saudi Group documents given that the Saudi government was starting his own move against Al Haramain, Saudi Arabia.

And I will defer to Mr. Haefele.

THE COURT: Your turn, Mr. Haefele.

MR. HAEFELE: Thank you. I'm having trouble hearing Mr. Kabat.

Well, the one point I would like to make to your

Honor -- and I think it goes to something that your Honor was
saying, as well as the overall picture -- is that there is this
fiction that there is no connection.

In addition to everything that I have already said, your Honor, something that's very important to keep in mind

here is that the head of the Saudi office and the vice head of the Saudi office, numbers one and two in the Saudi headquarters, were also numbers one and two in the U.S. branch office. So, to say that there was no control, no ability, no say, is a fiction.

And, in addition to that, since three of the officers, those two plus Mr. Al Butay, are also at the Saudi office, much of the information about the Saudi office or that's available in the Saudi office goes very importantly to what was known or knowable to the Oregon office. So, what's known or knowable at headquarters, what's known or knowable throughout the Al Haramain network is all pertinent.

One important issue in the case is what the Oregon Group's activities were with the main office, so information about the communications between the offices is important, but it also includes the knowledge in the main office about the activities of Al Haramain overall. They were a part of that network, and to the extent that Al Haramain was doing things that were inappropriate, improper under the law, that go to terrorist support, terrorist financing, and the Oregon office continued in that network with that knowledge, that's all very important with regard to the plaintiffs' claims.

So, what the U.S. branch office knew about Al Haramain worldwide is important, and that's discoverable, your Honor.

THE COURT: One thing I haven't heard any mention of

in this discussion, although the papers speak to it, is the Quran Foundation.

MR. HAEFELE: I can speak to that briefly, your Honor. The Quran Foundation is basically Mr. Seda. Mr. Seda set it up. Mr. Seda pretty much did the same thing.

The Al Haramain entity basically came on the scene to supplement and to enlarge the size, enlarge the scope of, to enlarge the financial capabilities of what the Quran Foundation is doing. The Quran Foundation was Mr. Seda. Everything that he did under the Quran Foundation he eventually did that and more under Al Haramain's name. They had the same office, they were run by the same guy, they had the same staff, they shared offices, phone numbers, computer networks. Everything that was the Quran Foundation was what Mr. Seda was doing with Al Haramain. There is really no distinction.

THE COURT: But for purposes of the present motion, what is the relief you want? Is it a ruling that the two Al Haramain foundations should be viewed as a single entity?

Well, clearly it's that, that they should be viewed as a single entity such that the Saudi Arabian entity should be producing documents or should have preserved documents at an earlier time. But beyond that what is it you are seeking presently?

MR. HAEFELE: You know, our position is since they are alter egos, to the extent we have requested information from Al Haramain the U.S. branch, that requires them to produce

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denied.

anything that the U.S. branch or that can be gotten related to the greater Al Haramain knowledge of what was going on in Al Haramain worldwide.

As to the Quran Foundation, since it really is the same, and since they shared information, and since a number of the documents that have been produced indicate that there was really little distinction between things going on at the Quran Foundation, things going on at the Al Haramain foundation the U.S. branch, there is a problem that there may be substantial documents in Mr. Seda's possession that relate to work that was done for either or. And since that distinction is dissolved for the most part, we want to see the documents from the Quran Foundation that relate to Al Haramain, and I think that's the way the request was made.

THE COURT: Is Mr. Seda a defendant in the suit?

MR. HAEFELE: Yes, he is. I believe the discovery is open to him as well. I think his motion to dismiss was also

THE COURT: OK. Well, I guess one question would be has he been subpoensed -- not subpoensed -- has he been given a request for production of documents?

MR. HAEFELE: He has not, because we understood that the request to the Al Haramain Foundation was sufficient. And he was the U.S. officer. I mean we could do it, but it would be redundant.

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THE COURT: Well, it might be, but it might not be.

Who represents him, by the way, do you know?

MR. HAEFELE: The same lawyers, your Honor, Mr. Kabat's office.

MR. KABAT: Yes.

THE COURT: I'll ask him the question: If he were served with a request for production of documents individually, would it yield any more documents?

MR. KABAT: I don't think so, your Honor, because what happened is that when Mr. Seda was overseas, the government, you know, seized all the documents that were in the Ashland office, and then they turned them over to his defense attorney in Portland. He is represented by the public defender. They in turn gave us a copy, and we produced those to the plaintiffs. So, that seems to be the totality of what was in the Ashland office.

THE COURT: There was also a discussion in the various papers I received about the extent to which various requests or, more particularly, interrogatories were overbroad or the objections to those interrogatories were boilerplate. Should we discuss that today, or is it more appropriate for me to first decide the issue we have been talking about thus far and then see where that take us?

MR. HAEFELE: Your Honor, I would go whichever way your Honor would prefer.

MR. KABAT: Your Honor, I would agree you should decide the first issue. And I would also note that the plaintiffs' reply brief, the January 5 brief, did not address any of our response on the overbroad and so forth issues, so they're fully submitted on the papers.

THE COURT: OK. Well, then I will focus first on the issue of whether the -- well, I guess it's one and a half issues -- whether the Saudi entity and the U.S. entity should be viewed as one in the same, and if the Saudi entity comes into the loop, whether that implicates all of the worldwide activities of the Foundation, since I gather there were what Mr. Haefele would call and I guess at times what the Foundation called branch offices in other countries.

MR. HAEFELE: Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HAEFELE: Two points that I would like to make to your Honor, fairly simplistic I hope.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. HAEFELE: We didn't respond to the additional issue related to the scope or the burden or the breadth of the discovery requests in our later letter because we thought we did cover it substantially in our December 2 letter on pages 14 and 15. But the other issue is if you look at our December 2 letter, on the bottom of page 15 there is a really important typo that I would like to correct for your Honor.

THE COURT: Is that the one where you left out the word "not"?

MR. HAEFELE: Yes, it is.

THE COURT: I caught that. I read it twice because it did seem to be a change in your position.

MR. HAEFELE: I read it a lot over the weekend and tried to figure out where that word "not" was.

THE COURT: I had already taken the liberty of correcting that in my copy.

MR. HAEFELE: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK. As to this issue I'm going to reserve decision.

The next conference before Judge Daniels is scheduled for April 15. I haven't a clue whether he will hold that conference or not, but I wanted to alert everyone and let whoever is not here who needs to know know that I have asked him if it is held on April 15 to move it to the afternoon because I have a conflict in the morning. So if it occurs, and assuming it occurs on April 15, it's likely to be the afternoon, not the morning.

Anything else anybody wants to bring up today?

MR. CARNER: A minor thing we mentioned earlier. As I mentioned, we are in this difficult situation where discovery is ongoing as to Al Haramain in one case but its motion remains pending in the rest of the cases. And we very much would like

to try to harmonize the situation. So, to the extent that we're going to make an application, would you prefer that go to you or to Judge Daniels?

THE COURT: No, I think that one should -- basically to say that everybody ought to be involved in whatever discovery is permitted as to Al Haramain U.S. and/or Saudi Arabia?

MR. CARNER: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: No, I think that should come to me.

MR. CARNER: OK. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK. Thank you, all.

MR. HAEFELE: Thank you, your Honor.